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The Utilitarian and Deontological Entanglement of
Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America
Robert Weisbergt
Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, Bernard E. Harcourt, ed.
NYU, 2003. Pp v, 436.
A volume that includes reviews of the constitutional framers'
1791 debates about the Bill of Rights, a social history of Wild West
vigilantism, and multiple regression analyses of policing techniques in
American inner cities-such a volume may seem to lack any unity,
save for the common denominator of guns in America. Yet, it is one of
the many peculiar aspects of the role of guns in the United States that
these disparate subjects or forms of discourse cannot easily be separated.
For this reason, the gun question is one of the strangest legal
phenomena in modern America. It is a weird combination of uncertainties, in part because of the interplay between utilitarian concerns
and deontological arguments. Most relationships between constitutional law and empirics involve constitutional principles that clearly
invoke utilitarian concerns in terms of interest-balancing. A free
speech or equal protection right, for example, must be weighed against
a regulatory interest in preventing some social harm, where the
evaluation of the harm may be somewhat aided by empirical inquiries.
Sometimes the clash between deontology and empirics becomes sharp.
For example, the conservative argument that Miranda' has significantly reduced confessions raises a second-order concern about how
much the reduction in confessions weakened law enforcement, but
f Edwin E. Huddleson. Jr., Professor of Law, Stanford University.
I Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436,444 (1966) (finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination prevents the prosecution from using statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the government demonstrates the use of specific procedural safeguards to protect the privilege).
2
Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment. 90 Nw U
L Rev 387,437-38 (1996) (estimating that Miranda has led to lost cases against 3.8 percent of all
suspects questioned in the United States), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect:
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 500. 544-47 (1996)
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also bumps up against the deontological question about the nature of
Fifth Amendment rights, to which the cost of Miranda is completely
irrelevant.' With guns, the relationship between utilitarianism and deontology is even more complicated. Many stress the deontological argument that a right to bear arms is an element of democratic selfautonomy or, somewhat more modestly, that aggressive gun control
will inevitably interfere with related deontological rights such as the
right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. But even when
the gun debate turns to utilitarian concerns, there is no consensus on
whether the presence of guns is inherently or categorically a social
positive or negative, or, assuming guns can both protect and threaten
lives, whether the net effect is positive or negative. On a practical
level, there is no consensus as to whether we have the capacity to design a solution that will not do more harm than good or whether any
net negative effect is inevitable because gun possession is so deeply
embedded in American society. As a result, the "gun question" is indeed a m6lange of historical, philosophical, constitutional, sociological,
and econometric threads. Moreover, the widely held and substantially
accurate view that the United States is an exceptionally violent or
homicidal nation and the tangled relationship between this violence
exceptionalism and the core values that animate liberal constitutionalism make discussion of one aspect of the gun question without addressing others almost impossible.
Though these fundamental divides about the gun question lead to
a highly eclectic volume, Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America

purports to have a fairly singular theme and focus: to avoid extremes
of legal argument and social philosophy in favor of "more nuanced
and subtle discussions of particular policy interventions" so as "to
promote more concrete and less polarized debates about guns" (p 3).
In pursuing this goal, the volume explores three major areas of the
gun question. First, a discussion of the historical and contemporary
values wrapped up with guns in American society leads to the conclusion that, because of the associated values' force, the empirical debate
over the utility of guns is a matter that cannot be resolved in general
(arguing that Cassell's failure to make certain necessary adjustments artificially inflates the
apparent cost of Miranda).
3
See, for example, Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L Rev 109,171-72
(1998) (arguing that the Miranda decision does not subject Fifth Amendment rights to a balancing test against the cost to law enforcement of respecting those rights); Schulhofer, 90 Nw U L
Rev at 549-56 (cited in note 2) (disagreeing with Cassell's characterization of the Fifth Amendment and treatment of Miranda as merely prophylactic).
4
See Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second Amendment: American Character,
Constitutionalism, and Crime, 39 Houston L Rev 1, 44-50 (2002) (exploring the relationship
between the interpretation of American violence exceptionalism and the liberal, anti-gun treatment of the Second Amendment and the gun debate).
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terms. Next, a discussion of the constitutional thread of the gun question suggests that the constitutional debate over the meaning of the
Second Amendment rests clearly on the side of gun control in terms
of the state of the law in the courts,' but in a sufficiently vague and
evasive way that a fair amount of further control can probably be implemented without any resolution of the constitutional debate. And
finally, a discussion of policy interventions shows an implicit social
consensus that the focal point for addressing gun danger in the United
States is somewhere in the chain of transactions between retail dealers
and street criminals, but that even designing finely honed enforcement
efforts aimed at that focal point provokes some of the same cultural,
legal, and empirical debates that animate the larger controversy about
the role of guns in America.
I. GUNS AND VALUES

Three essays set the premise of the volume: that rational policy
analysis about guns must respect the (often irrational) discourse of
cultural value that guns provoke in America. Franklin Zimring shows
that America's obsession with deploying broad symbolic values in gun
debates often undermines efforts at critical or empirical nuance. Richard Slotkin traces this problem to deeply embedded political and
social symbolism at the advent of mass handgun manufacture in the
nineteenth century. And Bernard Harcourt describes the manifestations of these traditions in contemporary youth and young criminal
minds. Thus, the gun debate is a tangle of two types of sub-debatesone utilitarian and one deontological -that are at once intertwined
and equally unsettled.
In terms of public debate and media visibility, as Franklin Zimring's contribution notes, guns generally were not a major political issue in the United States for much of the twentieth century, at least after the passage of legislation dealing with gangland-era machinegunning violence (pp 29-30). But, for a number of reasons, guns loudly
entered public debate a generation ago. The dramatic rise in crime in
the 1960s and '70s (p 30), the Kennedy assassination (p 30), the
Reagan assassination attempt (pp 36-37), and the rise of the Southern
Republicans as a swing political constituency that the pro-gun groups
could exploit may all have politically energized both pro- and anti-gun
5 The controlling precedent is still United States v Miller, 307 US 174, 178 (1939) (holding
that the Second Amendment addresses the preservation of the militia, not an individual right of
gun ownership), although one appellate court in dictum recently made an interesting gesture in
favor of individual rights, see United States v Emerson, 270 F3d 203, 260 (5th Cir 2001) ("We
reject the collective rights and sophisticated collective rights models for interpreting the Second
Amendment. We hold, consistent with Miller, that it protects the right of individuals ... to privately possess and bear their own firearms."), cert denied, 536 US 907 (2002).
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forces, while recent events like school massacres have kept the debate
over guns in the media (p 41). In addition, politicians in Southern and
Western states, where gun owners faced no significant regulation, nevertheless entered the fray with new statutes easing restrictions on the
possession of concealed handguns, thus exploiting gun rights for their
political value as symbols of resistance to federal regulation (p 37).
Though he has been a major scholarly participant in the gun debate,6
here Zimring steps back to offer a meta-description of the debate as
an evolving phenomenon of political rhetoric, noting the key perennial-if irrational-features of the debate. From Zimring's perspective, the gun debate is characterized by five constant elements: the
free-lunch syndrome, the gender gulch, handgun centrality, symbolic
dominance, and generality of preferences (pp 31-36). Zimring characterizes the promise of substantial reductions in violence from the passage of small and uncontroversial restrictions on guns as the freelunch syndrome (p 33). The gender gulch refers to a massive gender
gap in gun ownership, which simultaneously is accompanied by a
greater female propensity toward gun control and opposition to gun
possession (pp 34-35). The centrality of handguns in public discussion
and the media exaggerates their significance in terms of lethal harm to
innocents vis-A-vis long arms and obscures the feasibility of treating
handguns and long arms differently for control purposes (pp 35-36).
The policy debates about guns still largely involve exchanges of symbolic value sentiments, with those sentiments drowning out the differences among particular programs; small and big proposed changes in
gun laws provoke the same reactions (p 32).
In effect, these observations corroborate the volume's thesis, underscored in the Introduction by Bernard Harcourt: given these factors, future constructive discussions of guns and legality will have to
be far more particular in treating the nuanced differences among specific approaches (p 3). The approaches that best remain below the political radar and best finesse both constitutional questions and the
politicians' fear of the National Rifle Association (NRA) will focus on
punishing gun use by those manifestly involved in crime-criminals.
The most obvious way to do that is to punish and deter gun-using
criminals through enhanced punishments, but that popular approach
requires the complement of interdiction or prevention, which in turn
entails secondary market controls deploying tracing and registration

See, for example, Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem:
6
Lethal Violence in America ch 7 (Oxford 1997) (discussing whether and to what extent gun use
explains the high rate of lethal interpersonal violence in the United States); Franklin E. Zimring,
Kid, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic. 59 L & Contemp Probs 25
(1996) (examining youth gun use and potential countermeasures).
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mechanisms. But such controls, alas, tend to evoke just the general,
often demagogic sentiments that Zimring warns of.
Richard Slotkin's essay gives a flavor of the symbolic value of
guns in American historical lore, and in frontier lore in particular
(pp 56-58). Slotkin gives us a historical perspective on why both the
empirical and constitutional issues surrounding the gun question seem
so fraught with significance and passion (pp 63-64). The mythology of
guns is a strange mixture of true American history (pp 60-62) and
popular culture (pp 58-59). But as Slotkin shows, what seems peculiar,
if not unique, in American history is the legitimacy of private violence
and the association of the gun with a form of individual autonomy
supposedly consistent with democratic government (pp 54-55). Slotkin describes the strategy-and possibly the sincere intention-of the
makers of the famous Colt repeating revolver (pp 59-60). Colt is often
credited with the notion of making handguns the great democratic
"equalizer" (pp 54, 58). In fact, the modern historian Daniel Boorstin
so named the Colt revolver when he remarked that the advent of the
Colt coincided with the democratization of the accepted ritual of oneon-one combat to resolve disputes, once limited to aristocratic duels
(pp 57-58). Indeed, as Slotkin shows in a nice sociological point, battles with Colt guns were usually more matters of drunken brawling or
stealthy lying-in-wait killings (p 58). And more strikingly, Colt himself
sold his guns on a counter-egalitarian principle-as a tool to enable
the few to rule over the masses (p 60). Indeed, in a remarkable interview, Colt told of his desire to help small-plantation owners resist
slave revolts (p 59).
Slotkin's history leads us nicely to Bernard Harcourt's contribution to this debate. Harcourt's essay links the symbolic/mythological
value of guns in the Wild West to one of its ironic legacies, the symbolic value of guns among crime-oriented youth in modern America.
In a study of incarcerated youth, combining attitude survey questions
with semiotic analyses of verbal responses (p 69), Harcourt notes that
when these youth speak of guns they often do so with a passion and
allure almost sexual (p 86). Harcourt codes the youths' responses and
associations into three clusters, which he denominates "actionprotection," "commodity-dislike," and "recreation-respect" (pp 83-85).
These clusters correspond to the role that actual and imagined guns
play in the minds of violence-prone youths: guns are the instruments
by which social dominance and respect are achieved on the cusp of
fatal thrill-seeking in the action-protection cluster (pp 83-84); they are
the almost literal currency of the entrepreneurial capitalism more
generally associated with much street crime in the commodity-dislike
cluster (p 84); they serve a strange kind of civic value as a symbolic
model of a comic version of the Republican-country version of elite
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self-governance; and they are also tools to be treated instrumentally
and functionally in the recreation-respect cluster (pp 84-85).
II. THE INEXTRICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL THREAD

But in another sense, Slotkin's history leads us back to the constitutional question: if the gun was far more the tool of the powerful and
the elite than of the masses, what lesson is to be drawn? From one
perspective, this history undoes one of the value-bases for the individual rights Second Amendment argument. On the other hand, it can be
used to strengthen that argument if it shows that the benefits of individual gun ownership have always belonged to political elites, so that
an evolving Constitution would expand those rights downward.'

Equality can remain the goal, in other words, but the question is
whether we ratchet rights up or down.
In a sense, the Second Amendment question has been a minor
sideshow to contemporary constitutional law. But it has also in some
ways been a nutshell-epitome of it, a matter of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny. That is, the constitutional questions about guns ap-

peared fairly recently; as an academic matter, one might say, the constitutional question was invented about twenty years ago, and in an
incredibly compressed time has gone through dramatic phases. San-

ford Levinson, who can accept credit for bringing the debate into the
constitutional mainstream, uses his essay in this new volume to
review that history. Levinson discusses the prematurity of the claim by
some academics' that an individual rights conception of the Second
7 A discussion of the limitation of early gun ownership to elites (as sometimes abetted by
"Civic Republicanism") might logically lead either to undermining or enhancing the constitutional argument for the individual right to keep and bear arms. See Weisberg, 39 Houston L Rev
at 13-14 (cited in note 4) (reflecting on the contested empirical finding that colonial gun ownership was both limited in number and by law to high-status men and observing that such a discovery is not categorically decisive in interpreting the Second Amendment). For a comprehensive
treatment of the history of the Second Amendment that suggests that any original individual
right may have evolved into practical desuetude, see generally Michael C. Dorf, What Does the
Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi Kent L Rev 291 (2000) (arguing that the rejection of
an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment is justified by the standard tools of
constitutional interpretation).
8 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637 (1989) (discussing the paucity of mainstream academic commentary on the Second Amendment prior to his
writing and calling for serious and honest constitutional analysis of the Amendment even if what
is discovered does not comport with the dominant politics of legal academia).
9 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus
on the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L J 1139, 1143-92 (1996) (defending the consensus around
an individual rights conception of the Second Amendment against charges of academic dishonesty and pro-gun conspiracy); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning
of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich L Rev 204, 273 (1983) ("Unmistakably the Founders intended the second amendment to guarantee an individual right to possess certain kinds of weapons in the home [for] certain kinds of circumstances."). See also David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L Rev 1359, 1362 n 1 (enumerating "standard
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Amendment is uncontested. The success of the pro-gun academic
lobby in getting the individual rights view of the Second Amendment
on the law review airwaves (so much so that its leaders were able to
proclaim that this thesis had become the "Standard Model") might be
viewed as a rhetorical move pulled off by flooding the law reviews and
then scoring the results,"' but to call it a rhetorical move is hardly to
refute it. And it was briefly a brilliant success, in part because it did
win considerable acceptance in the mainstream by calling the bluff of
constitutional liberals and demanding that they commit to an individual rights model of the Bill of Rights generally even though, or especially because, that view might run counter to their political views and
thereby reinforce the anti-majoritarian nature of judicial review."
Moreover, for some, the Standard Model is appealing for its sheer historical plausibility. American elites at the turn of the nineteenth century would presumably have thought they had an inalienable right to
own weapons. They might even have thought this was the point of the
otherwise odd prose of the Second Amendment, rather than that it
served to constrain the gun rights of others. This is surely more plausible historically than the view that the elites would have shared modern liberal distaste for guns or concern about poor people's crime.'2
There followed a period of sharp debate and purported refutation, ranging from rather tendentious insistence on plain meaning explanations of the Second Amendment suspiciously opposite to the
plain meaning arguments by the individual rights advocates, to more
nuanced views about the militia clause." Some have insisted that the
Amendment is truly just about militias but reconcile this with the general libertarian, anti-government strain in American politics by insisting that "rights of the militia" was and is no frivolous issue." Others
have used deep review of the documentary and legislative sources to
support the militia view, but largely in a negative way, stressing far
model" writings).
M0 See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 BU L Rev 57, 138 (1995) ("[T]he gun lobby is also working hard to
flood the law reviews with friendly scholarship from sympathetic law professors and promising
law students.").
1 See Levinson, 99 Yale L J at 658-59 (cited in note 8) (discussing Martha Minow's thesis
on the desirability of encouraging different voices in the legal conversation and the disconnect
between liberal scholars' biases as to the Second Amendment and pro-gun citizens, politicians.
and interest groups).
12 See Weisberg, 39 Houston L Rev at 5 (cited in note 4) (discussing the liberal attempt in
"Civic Republicanism" to reconcile a partisan desire for a collective Second Amendment right
with the historical evidence that that right is an individual one).
13 See, for example, Dorf, 76 Chi Kent L Rev 291 (cited in note 7).
14 See Carl T. Bogus. The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship:A Primer,
76 Chi Kent L Rev 3, 15-21 (2000) (chronicling Akhil Amar's and possibly Laurence Tribe's
defection from a collective rights reading of the Second Amendment to one that is more closely
individualistic via a broad reading of the militia clause).
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more the absence of an individual right than the meaningful presence
of something else."
Both sides in the Second Amendment debate may by now have
shown their best historical and interpretive hands, and so the debate
may be at a standstill. This could mean (a) the debate will fade from
public salience despite the combativeness of the advocates, and will be
looked back on as a curious constitutional episode; or (b) we have
reached a temporary equilibrium, to be followed by a rich, new phase
of constitutional theorizing and historical discovery; or (c) in the view
of various combatants, the debate is over because one side has unequivocally won.
The first view finds support in the simple fact that the whole debate so far has had little direct effect on American law.' The gun lobby
brings many lawsuits to challenge the constitutionality of certain restrictions; occasionally the Second Amendment is raised as a defense
to a criminal charge, though virtually never successfully. Legislative
debates over guns remain contentious, and the political arguments by
the NRA, which have proved fairly powerful in defeating or preventing some types of legislation, are enhanced by their Second Amendment rhetoric. But there is little evidence that the constitutional issue
has really played any role: beyond political sound bites and its alliance
with policy views, the constitutional issue does not seem to concern
legislatures. Actual Second Amendment litigation has been almost
nonexistent. A fair speculation is that now that enough stuff has been
thrown up on both sides of the constitutional debate, the debate will
remain a wash and politicians will continue to argue over the particulars.
The second view would hold that new academic research will further complicate and enrich the issue. Levinson believes we are simply
at an early stage of Second Amendment scholarship, debate, and litigation (p 96). But he may be overestimating the richness of the
materials, or underestimating how much the gravitational pull of the
cultural attitudes described by Zimring and Slotkin will limit the likelihood that any new point of historical research will change the pitch
or direction of the gun debate. Nevertheless, Levinson insists on several important complications in the Second Amendment debate that
15 See, for example, Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the
Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16
Const Commen 221, 238-45 (1999) (observing that rather than a right to individual resistance,
the Second Amendment was more likely a means of equipping the state to crush internal rebellions).
16 The recent dictum in United States v Emerson. 270 F3d 203, 220-27 (5th Cir 2001), cert
denied, 536 US 907 (2002). is a rule-proving exception. See id at 220 ("None of our sister circuits
has subscribed to this model, known by commentators as the individual rights model or the standard model.").
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have received little attention so far, but could lead to a new round of
scholarly combat. So, for example, Levinson notes that when state
constitutions or statutes restrict individual gun ownership they do not
necessarily reflect a tolerance for federal control (p 105). Hence much
of the state law evidence marshaled against the Standard Model may
not refute, and might even support by negative implication, the early
understanding of gun rights, at least as against the national government. But Levinson is also explicit about constitutional law as a "cultural product" whose momentum often takes it far from the intent of
the authors or the perceptions of the first audience (p 106). Plus, he
believes that we have to read the Second Amendment as it applies to
state regulation in light of the Civil War Amendments, even if we are
to rely on originalism (p 108). The 1866 vision of the right to keep and
bear arms, he argues, was "profoundly individualistic," given that Reconstruction states were distrusted to protect the rights of former
slaves and white abolitionists against the nascent Ku Klux Klan
(p 108).
As for the possibility of a final victory, partisans on both sides use
"case closed" rhetoric on occasion. The Standard Modelers, relying on
both text and legislative history, continue to deny that they have even
been seriously wounded by the collective rights proponents,'7 while
historian Garry Wills plays the same part for the collective rights proponents.'" Somewhat more sober claims come from historians who insist that the legislative history, especially in relation to questions of
federalism and comparisons to state constitutions, has clearly demonstrated that the Second Amendment was never meant to have any
great significance at all for the role of guns in the United States. This
set of scholars adopts various understandings of why the Framers
would have bothered to include in the Bill of Rights a rather undramatic provision dealing with state militias.'"
17 See, for example, Nelson Lund. Outsider Voices on Guns and the Constitution, 17 Const

Commen 701, 708 (2000) ("At least as an intellectual matter, the debate about the states' rights
versus individual rights interpretations seems now to be essentially over."); Barnett and Kates. 45
Emory L J at 1259 (cited in note 9) ("Almost unanimously, scholars have concluded that the
Amendment does indeed present real hurdles to the banning of guns. If there is an intellectually
viable response, it has yet to be made."): Joyce Lee Malcolm. Second Amendment Symposium:
Panelist. 10 Seton Hall Const L J 829.836-37 (2000) (commenting that the individual rights conception of the Second Amendment has prevailed, but that many academics cannot accept an
honest reading of the Amendment because it does not comport with their partisan agendas):
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn L Rev 461. 463
(1995) (noting that the Standard Model of individual rights dominates the scholarship, but that
within the agreed framework of the Standard Model there is continued room for debate).
18 Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, NY Rev Books 62-63 (Sept 21. 1995) (implying
that the scholars behind the Standard Model are few and beholden to the gun lobby, that their
work is inferior, and that the original understanding of the Second Amendment does not comport with the Standard Model).
19 Cornell, 16 Const Commen 221 (cited in note 15).
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The closest thing to a settling argument has been provided by
Jack Rakove. In a meticulous review of the legislative history, Rakove
takes a rather minimalist view of the Second Amendment; he sees the
1787 and 1788 debates at the Constitutional Convention as focused

mostly on rather technical, if politically troubled, adjustments in the
relative powers of the state and federal governments over the arming
of militias.2" For Rakove, the Amendment does not address grand issues of autonomy and right, but rather signals little more than the
Framers' somewhat condescending acknowledgment of the states' fear
that Congress would put burdensome regulations on the militia.2
Rakove might therefore implicitly lend support to an important tenet
of the pro-gun position -that the Amendment was animated by a fear
of national totalitarianism." But Rakove has more mundane things in
mind-for him, it was supervisory abuse and neglect by Congress, not
totalitarian violence by the federal government, that the Framers
agreed to constrain."
A complementary "settling" argument comes from historian Saul
Cornell, who declares that the originalist argument for the individual
rights approach is based on a false reading of the legislative history
and legal context. 4 Cornell therefore might simply accept Rakove's
modest view of the positive role of the Amendment. However, Cornell
also temptingly suggests that some "new paradigm" of Second
Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment. The Highest Stage of Originalism,76 Chi Kent
L Rev 103, 129 (2000). See also Cornell, 16 Const Commen at 228-37 (cited in note 15) (noting
that although eighteenth-century Pennsylvania was a relatively pro-gun state, there was no consensus among Pennsylvanians, even among anti-Federalists, as to the necessity of a general right
to bear arms, and that Pennsylvania gun laws were very restrictive).
21
Rakove, 76 Chi Kent L Rev at 141-44, 151 (cited in note 20) (noting that during the ratification debates, anti-Federalists were concerned about how the right to bear arms would affect
state sovereignty and federalism and were not concerned about a private right to bear arms).
22
See, for example, Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice, Lethal Laws 9-12 (Jews
for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership 1995) (concluding that "'gun control' is an essential
precondition for genocide"); Daniel D. Polsby and Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun
Control, 75 Wash U L Q 1237, 1237 (1997) ("[A] connection exists between the restrictiveness of
a country's civilian weapons policy and its liability to commit genocide upon its own people.");
David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the
People. 81 Cornell L Rev 879, 901 (1996) ("The immediate (though perhaps not the only) concern prompting the Second Amendment was a fear that the federal government might use its
Article I powers to disarm the militia and pave the way for tyranny.").
23 Rakove, 76 Chi Kent L Rev at 158 (cited in note 20) (arguing that the Second Amendment can be read as a reminder to the federal government of its obligation to ensure that the
militias are well organized, armed, and disciplined). And in any event, he argues, the constraint
was to lie with the militias narrowly defined, not any populist militia of the whole. Id at 131-32
(suggesting that militias could be equated with the entire male population capable of bearing
arms. but could also be something less because militias were subject to national and state legislative authority and were no longer pre-constitutionally distinct from those authorities).
24 See Saul Cornell, "Don't Know Much About History": The Current Crisis in Second
Amendment Scholarship, 29 N Ky L Rev 657 (2002): Cornell, 16 Const Commen 221 (cited in
note 15).
20
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Amendment scholarship may emerge, one that views the right to bear
arms as neither collective nor individual but rather as a "civic right,"2
in the nature of a civic republican right to be exercised by those "capable of exercising it in a virtuous manner. ' 6'There is something ironic
about a key part of Cornell's thesis. In his deft and lawyerly arguments
for the originalist collective rights view, Cornell underscores the later
eruption of individual rights rhetoric in nineteenth-century state constitutions in order to stress the absence of any such view in 1791." The
problem is that even though this makes sense in terms of originalism,
it ends up conceding that as a matter of the political culture of constitutional value, the individual rights interpretation of the right to keep
and bear arms had purchase in the nineteenth century. Admittedly, the
individual rights proponents have not argued for an evolving constitutional view of the Amendment-instead staking their claim on
originalism.' But Cornell perhaps unwittingly gives a kind of indirect
strength to the individual rights view by demonstrating how that view
surely entered the discourse of constitutional values in the nineteenth
century.
Legal historian Carl Bogus, like Cornell but unlike Rakove,
strives to impute some continuing significance to the Amendment. But
where Cornell thinks the Amendment might spark rich philosophical
debate, Bogus sees it as serving a very specific political purpose. Bogus
reviews three historical cases (pp 120-27), from Orville Faubus-era
Southern resistance to federally mandated school desegregation, to
illustrate that federal-state clashes over the militia have the capacity
to raise legally and politically significant questions about the Second
Amendment, even once that Amendment is stripped of any conception of noncollective rights. Bogus's challenge is to use these episodes,
which obviously ended quickly and decisively in favor of national
power, as proof that the Amendment could someday play a role in restraining the fascistic exercises of national power in the name of national emergency.2 Because Bogus suggests only that states have some
2-5 Cornell, 29 N Ky L Rev at 657, 678--81 (cited in note 24) (observing that the pure individual and collective rights models are not capable of assimilating complex historical evidence
and that a third model characterized by civic rights might be developed in response).
26 See id at 679.
27 See id at 675-77.
28 But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creationand Reconstruction 215-23 (Yale
1998) (stating that the Civil War Amendments sought to redress racism by granting equal rights
to armed self-protection); Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Georgetown L J 309,343-46 (1991) (suggesting
that the Fourteenth Amendment transformed the meaning of the Second Amendment by extending the prohibition of the violation of the individual right from the national government to
the state governments).
29
Bogus's essay pre-dates September 11, 2001, but might he suggest that the Second
Amendment be invoked to protest the accretion of federal power in the name of anti-terrorism?
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minimal right, the parameters of which are unclear, to provide for
their own security, the hypothetical situations in which a state is actually deprived of this right by the federal government may be implausible.' ' In any event, the implausibility of future Second Amendment
crises in Bogus's terms might simply mean that the Amendment has
been a great success at restraining federal deprivation of the collective
right of self-defense.
Caught in the crossfire between individual rightists and collectivists, each marshalling historical evidence to bolster their position and
bickering about the validity of the other camp's data points, Christopher Eisgruber proposes that the constitutional question be addressed
ahistorically (p 140). Eisgruber reviews original/textualist, "intratextual," and other meaning sources and finds them too equivocal to be
useful (pp 142-51). Implicitly taking up the suggestion of a paradigmatic new "civic right," Eisgruber argues that the way to read the constitutional stalemate is that there is a lawyerly tie between binary arguments about individual and collective rights, and that we should
therefore attempt a new approach altogether (p 140). Thus, Eisgruber
argues that it is pointless to draw specific meanings from the language
of the Amendment; instead we should treat it as a trope expressing
constitutional significance, a kind of moral imprimatur of political philosophy (p 141). Eisgruber urges that the proper way to read the
Amendment is as a spur to conducting future legislative debates over
gun control, with the Amendment serving as a kind of ethical prod to
engage in those debates on a high-minded, noninstrumentalist or political level, in order to adopt the position most in accord with democratic values.
Eisgruber next asks what sorts of enforceable rights of gun ownership and military service citizens of a free republic ought to have,
turning a critical eye on pro-gun arguments that gun ownership is necessary for democratic authority and individual autonomy (p 151). On
the former, Eisgruber is perhaps too dismissive of the great quandary
of how to refute the anti-dictatorship trope of the gun advocates. He
essentially says that the speculative benefit of individual gun ownership in the unlikely event that guns are the last thing available to resist
tyranny is outweighed by the threat of antidemocratic violence by
widespread gun use (p 152). The rebuttal of the autonomy argument is
stronger. But, he argues, this is so complex and empirical a questionhe refuses to see it as a deontological one but solely as one of selfMight the federal government someday illegitimately nationalize the state militias to fight in
Iraq or Afghanistan (pp 133-34)?
3( But Bogus's intellectual acrobatics remain an intriguing effort to sustain some antifederalist salience to the Second Amendment while also effectively closing the case against the
individual rights view with respect to crime-focused gun control measures.
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defense-that it should solely be a matter of legislative line-drawing,
no different from drugs and medicine (pp 153-54). Eisgruber would
concede that his approach works only at a high level of abstraction
and does not provide any specific guidance to legislatures or courts on
how to draw these lines. Ultimately, Eisgruber may make more sense
descriptively than prescriptively, or perhaps predictively, because regardless of whether dramatic new constitutional arguments emerge,
they are unlikely to have much effect on policy debates except in the
sense that Eisgruber describes.
III.

POLICY INTERVENTIONS

The empirical quandary about modern gun control might be put
as follows. On the one hand, the great majority of guns in the United
States are owned by law-abiding citizens who keep them at home,
mostly out of a belief that they offer protection, while occasionally
using them for recreation (p 4)." This category of gun ownership by
itself seems hard for even the most ardent gun control advocates to
attack, except in the impressionistic sense that any gun ownership for
any supposedly socially useful purpose reinforces dangerous notions
about the psychological or instrumental value of guns, thereby encouraging abuses of gun ownership that lead to violence and homicide.
Nevertheless, let us stipulate that, however modest the social benefit
of this kind of gun ownership, its cost is close to zero. So there are only
two questions about it: does this type of gun ownership actually have
greater social value than I have stipulated, and conversely, would the
efforts needed to curtail other truly harmful forms of gun ownership
unduly interfere with this benign kind? On the other hand, with respect to the category of socially harmful gun ownership, we have what
I will call the modern Oakland problem. Despite dramatic drops in
homicides in major American cities, Oakland, California, stands outand we do not yet know how atypically-as a frightening site of renewed gun fatalities, with probably most of the killings associated with
drug markets and attendant social conflicts, along with horrifying random effects in terms of friends or families of targets or accidental bystanders getting caught in crossfire. 2 Here, the need to get guns out of
these hands is inarguable. Notwithstanding the consensus, the ques31 See Philip J.Cook and Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use 57 (Police Foundation 1996), Gary Kleck and
Mark Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun.
86 J Crim L & Criminol 150. 167 (1995) (citing a national survey in which 78 percent of gun
owners stated that they were willing to use a gun defensively in some way).
32 See Henry K. Lee. Girl, 16, Killed in Oakland; Teen's Shooting is the City's 109th Homicide of 2003, San Fran Chron A25 (Dec 3, 2003) (reporting that Oakland had 109 homicides
through December 2. 2003, five fewer than its 2002 total, which represented a five-year high).
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tions are: first, is there any feasible way to do so, and second, is there
any way to strip the latter category of gun owners of possession without interfering unduly with the other benign or arguably socially
beneficial type of gun ownership.
Here is one way, drawing on the research in this volume, that the
empirical problem can be framed. David Kopel lays out the following
very logical argument about the role of guns in regard to burglary.
Americans unquestionably have far more guns at home than people in
peer nations, and while Americans suffer from a higher rate of many
violent crime victimizations than residents of most of those nations,
the American rate of burglary is lower (pp 401-02). A very good explanation, reasonably abetted by anecdotal evidence of the perceptions of burglars, is that the threat of defensive gun use is a major deterrent in the United States (pp 407-08). This is a clever move by Kopel. First, by paying heed to the interesting complications raised by
new research into comparative crime rates among G8 and other developed nations, Kopel undercuts the argument of some gun control
advocates that the United States's anomalously high crime rate must
logically be tied to its anomalously high gun possession incidence. Instead, the picture is far more complicated and empirically more subtle;
there is considerable evidence that American "exceptionalism" is limited to violent crimes and homicide, not overall crime rates that include nonconfrontational burglaries." Second, the utility of guns to
prevent burglary bears on the most politically appealing aspect of gun
rights: home ownership by people who would never use those guns
except as a last line of self-defense. Furthermore, Kopel's hypothesis
has the virtue of being at once theoretically logical while also being,
ironically, immune to empirical refutation because it is immune to systematic study.! How could gun control advocates ever get the numbers on burglary deterrence of this form? How could we ever control
the relevant variables to do a cross-national comparison on this point?
In this regard, Kopel's argument is less ambitious, but in some ways
more powerful, than the controversial arguments about the crime33 See Zimring and Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem at 27-29 (cited in note 6) (illustrating that rates of crime victimization for most offenses in the United States are not that different
from rates in other countries, with the exception of homicide). But see Daniel D. Polsby and Don
B. Kates, Jr., American Homicide Exceptionalism,69 U Colo L Rev 969 (1998) (questioning Zimring and Hawkins's implication that American violence exceptionalism is driven by the prevalence of gun ownership rather than overall criminality).
34 To be sure, Kopel cites a number of statistical reports of the frequency with which people retrieved a firearm in response to an intrusion as well as the subcategories of these cases in
which the respondent actually confronted and deterred the burglar (pp 403-05). Understandably,
though, Kopel cannot measure how many burglaries are deterred ex ante by the fear of encountering an armed resident more accurately than the impressions gleaned from a few anecdotal
surveys of prisoners (pp 405-07).
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reducing efficacy of shall-issue laws by John Lott," currently the subject of heated refutational re-analysis by John Donohue and Ian
Ayres." Of course, if deterred burglars shift their criminality to robberies or other crimes, home gun ownership might not reduce, and might
even increase, serious crime. And indeed Kopel concedes that some
burglars diversify their portfolios with robberies (pp 408-09). But assuming Kopel is right that home gun ownership is a clear net deterrent, what follows? The not-very-shocking conclusion is that we
should avoid extreme forms of gun control that would categorically
deny people the right to keep guns in their homes, thereby eliminating
the critical mass of privately owned guns needed to deter burglars. But
the very reasonableness of Kopel's position weakens it. He is arguing
against the least likely form of gun control on the table-unless he
extends his argument to an attack on, say, restrictions on gun shows,
which seems hardly plausible. Perhaps the other irony of the Kopel
approach is that because the deterrence mechanism is the sheer number of guns, his thesis is consistent with the tragic resignation position
of many gun advocates-that crime is a fact of American society that
legislation cannot change.
Thus, perfectly consistent with Kopel, and stopping short of a toon home ownership of guns, is the possibility of the kind of
ban
tal
highly specific legislative or executive intervention that makes for the
most interesting discussion in this volume. At least as a matter of political salience, the most plausible interventions meet three criteria.
First, the interventions are most directly tied to very visible gun violence, even when they go beyond the fairly uncontroversial notion of
tacking higher penalties onto criminals who use guns. Second, the interventions depend far less on the infeasible notion of widespread gun
35 See John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control
Laws 94 (Chicago 1998) (asserting that passage of new nondiscretionary laws permitting a broad
right to carry concealed handguns has significantly reduced crime).
36
See Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue II, Shooting Down the " More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 Stan L Rev 1193 (2003) (challenging Lott's thesis by arguing that there is no
credible statistical evidence that adoption of concealed-carry laws will reduce crime, and rather
suggesting that such laws might actually increase the cost of crime); Florenz Plassmann and John
Whitley, Confirming "More Guns, Less Crime," 55 Stan L Rev 1313 (2003) (disputing Ayres and
Donohue's interpretation of their own findings and suggesting that statistical analysis of additional data corroborates the hypothesis that concealed-carry laws have reduced crime); Ian
Ayres and John J. Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Support of the "More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 Stan L Rev 1371 (2003) (replying to Plassmann and Whitley's article).
37 See Weisberg, 39 Houston L Rev at 42 (cited in note 4):

Finally, Kates and Polsby place a heavy bet on a default cultural theory. They passionately
invoke the claim of Colin Greenwood-that ethnic and social factors explain crime, that
guns are irrelevant, and that gun prohibition is pointless. They prefer perpetrator theories,
by which not government policy but the combination of sheer human perversity and varying convergences of social, political, and economic vectors explain modem crime booms,
and therefore incarceration booms, as rationally reactive state policy.
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recapture. And third, the interventions are part and parcel of other
kinds of research and innovation in new police methods.
Of course, categorical proscription of particular types of guns is
conceptually the simplest of approaches, is still one of considerable
political salience, and yet is virtually ignored in this volume. This omission may be motivated by the perceived futility of attempting to enact
a federal gun ban, given that concerns of federalism and national
media attention would incite fierce political opposition. However, the

absence of these complicating factors at the local level may contribute
to the decisions of a number of states and municipalities virtually to
forbid possession, and certainly the public carrying, of handguns and
other weapons. Notwithstanding the impracticability of a federal gun
ban, local politics are very much part of the gun debate and have occasionally enabled broad generic gun bans whose utility and feasibility
the volume does not acknowledge.
At the federal level, the one type of proscription that has shown
some political and legal feasibility has been the assault weapons ban.
Policy empiricists have been skeptical that bans of this kind could significantly affect crime rates, because, aside from the occasional dra-

matic multiple killing, murders involving weapons falling under any
reasonable definition of the term "assault weapons" still account for a
very small number of American homicides." Nevertheless, the assault
weapons issue was, along with the Brady Bill, the most notable site of
federal debate over the last decade, ' and it has been debated on very
38 See Garen Wintemute, Guns and Gun Violence, in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman,
eds, The Crime Drop in America 45, 78-83 (Cambridge 2000) (discussing municipal and state
bans on assault weapons and handguns).
39 See Zimring and Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem at 200 (cited in note 6):

A specific focus on handguns is an easy choice in the sense that it emerges from a profile of
the firearms at risk for every major category of lethal violence. With regard to homicide
generally, the per unit involvement of handguns is nine times as great as for long guns, and
the concentration in particular subsets of lethal violence, such as robbery, is even greater.
See also Wintemute, Guns and Gun Violence at 81 (cited in note 38) (stating that in the short run
the ban on assault-type firearms imposed by the 1994 Crime Bill had beneficial, but modest,
effects); David B. Kopel, "Assault Weapons," in David B. Kopel, ed, Guns: Who Should Have
Them? 159, 179-81 (Prometheus 1995) (asserting that assault weapons are only involved in a
small percentage of crimes). However, others argue that assault-style weapons account for,
among other things, as much as a fifth of all fatal attacks on police officers in the United States.
See Violence Policy Center, "Officer Down ": Assault Weapons and the War on Law Enforcement,
online at http://www.vpc.org/studies/officeone.htm (visited Jan 7, 2004):
Tie gun industry's evasion of the 1994 ban on assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition magazines continues to put law enforcement officers at extreme risk. Using data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Violence Policy Center has determined that at least 41 of the 211 law enforcement officers slain in the line of duty between
January1, 1998, and December 31, 2001, were killed with assault weapons.
40 See Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act. 18 USC § 922(v)(1)
(2000) ("It shall be unlawful for a person to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic
assault weapon."); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 USC § 922(s)-(t) (2000) (requir-
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revealing political and philosophical terms. Gun control advocateshowever little proof they have of the overall harm of "assault weapons"-know that the very term, though ambiguous, galvanizes public
support for gun control. Many gun control advocates surely believe
that banning assault weapons is the minimal concession that gun control opponents are morally obligated to make-akin to the uncontroversial bans on machine guns and larger military weapons.
By contrast, the assault weapons ban drives gun control opponents to fury, in part because they believe that any definition of "assault weapons" is necessarily so vague or arbitrary as to end up including large varieties of weapons that pose none of the supposed dangers
of "assault weapons" and indeed that are close to the core type of recreational weapons.' Moreover, even if the definition were tighter, gun
control opponents would generally prefer to tackle the subtle issues of
licensing and tracing laws than to open the policy path of categorical
bans of any kind.
Perhaps recognizing the Maginot lines around each side's position on gun bans, the volume plausibly assumes that the center of
gravity of any pragmatic approach to gun-violence reduction is really
quite clear in theory: the secondary market in new guns. Yet in exploring such interdictions, the volume proves far more convincing diagnostically than prescriptively.
One promising sub-area of secondary market interdiction is tracing, explained in great detail by Philip Cook and Anthony Braga. The
state and federal governments now cooperate in tracing guns used in
crimes back to the dealers who introduced them into the consumer
market (p 163). The issues associated with tracing are twofold:
(1) What does tracing accomplish? and (2) To what legal remedies
may it lead? In theory, as Cook and Braga note, tracing can lead to an
informing strategy about interdiction, assist in identifying specific
dealers and traffickers as targets of further police action, and serve as
a research tool to evaluate the effects of changes in gun control laws
(p 164). But traces are limited by their very nature and definition,
covering only the first retail sale (p 165). The failure to track subsequent transfers limits the interdictions that can be made in the secondary market. Further, while traces certainly confirm that Federal Fireing federally licensed firearms dealers to conduct background checks on handgun buyers). The
current federal assault weapons ban expires in 2004; Representative Conyers introduced the
Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2003, HR 2038, 108th Cong, 1st
Sess. in 149 Cong Rec H 3857 (May 8,2003), to reauthorize the ban.
41 For the basic arguments against assault weapons bans, see Kopel, Assault Weapons at
185-87, 192-200 (cited in note 39). For a discussion of recent cases attacking the constitutionality
and scope of certain state assault weapons bans, see Scott Charles Allan. Comment, People's
Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus: The Sixth Circuit Shoots Down Another Unconstitutional "Assault Weapons" Ban, 20 Pace L Rev 433.440-43 (2000).
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arms Licensees (FFLs) are a problem, traces themselves are not a solution. Nevertheless, traces do reveal an interesting and sobering fact:
most crime-traceable guns are fairly new (pp 170-73). The most dangerous guns appear to be relatively new guns that left the hands of
FFLs and fairly quickly ended up in the hands of people who were
probably ineligible to buy them in the first place. These transferees
obtain the guns by presenting false papers, arranging "straw man"
purchases, or simply stealing the guns from legal buyers-all with
fairly imminent malicious uses of the guns in mind (p 170).
Cook and Braga suggest that if new guns are disproportionately
represented both among those guns used in crimes and those recovered by the police, we should find reason for optimism (p 172). Presumably, Cook and Braga infer that the police are looking in the right
places, and that increases in enforcement efforts of the sort they describe might yield decreases in gun crimes. It is true that if the muchlamented supply of old guns is not a major factor in crime, then the
sheer volume of the gun supply in the United States is not so threatening to us as we might fear. On the other hand, we do not know if police recovery of guns will keep up with, or be overwhelmed by, supplies of new guns. In support of their optimism, Cook and Braga also
note that gun-using criminals tend to acquire guns illicitly and use
them quickly after they obtain them, often going through a number of
guns in very brief criminal careers (p 172). Therefore, they surmise, the
most efficient focus of interdiction resources is not the time after the
first retail sale of new guns, but at the point of or just after the transfers from the licit to the illicit market-most obviously off-the-books
sales by FFLs and sales to straw purchasers-and these transfers,
Cook and Braga suggest, are particularly vulnerable to enforcement
efforts (p 172). Once again, the optimistic interpretation of the available data may seem sensible in the abstract, but the proof will not be
forthcoming until we have a long enough period with enough gun interdictions to test their effect on crime rates.
Additionally, a great number of gun transfers involve quick interstate sales rather than a slow diffusion through long sequences of
more local transfers, suggesting a useful role for the Brady Law
(pp 178-81).' Thus it might seem that a narrow interdiction effort, not
a broad supply-side approach, will work best. Such interdiction would
especially focus on the small number of FFLs associated with a disproportionate number of traces. As Cook and Braga note, however,
42 See 18 USC § 922(s)-(t) (requiring sellers to delay completion of sale for up to five
business days pending a police background check on eligibility). By imposing a national background check rule, of course, the Brady Law aids enforcement in those states like Illinois that
already require checks on intrastate sales but cannot control the importing of guns from states
lacking such rules (pp 178-79).
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the number of traces can be an unfairly misleading figure, since it may
be due to uneven tracing efficiency-and also leaves open the question of the FFL's mens rea, especially where the business is in an unusually high-crime area (pp 176-77).
A natural conclusion is that the federal government, or more specifically the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF), is the logical medium for conducting the interdiction,
on the theory that its panoply of enforcement and investigative powers might be best suited to monitor the quick but elusive diffusion of
guns. But as two contributors to this volume demonstrate, the federal
role entails costs as well-political problems of federalism inherent in
any preemption of state autonomy, as well as institutional problems
within the federal justice system inherent in any effort to ensure uniform standards on prosecution. For example, as Daniel Richman
shows, the ATF is constantly buffeted by political concerns about excessive central federal powers (p 329) as well as, ironically, a diversion
of its resources in favor of Project Exile-type federal prosecutions
(pp 330-31), which are in some ways an even more aggressive centralization of national power. As for the general trend toward the federalization of criminal law, Sara Beale argues that the hostility to such
federalization demonstrated by the Supreme Court in the Lopez" and
Morrison4 decisions is likely an effort to preserve aspects of federalism in the criminal law and prevent a legislative effort to convert the
federal judiciary into a body of ordinary police courts (pp 348-50).
The federalization of the criminal law, Beale observes, leads to a federal judiciary that is swamped with cases that it lacks the discretion
not to hear (p 354), while federal prosecutors remain free to choose
what cases they pursue depending on their available resources
(pp 352-55).

The most bizarre problem in dealing with the secondary market is
the phenomenon of the gun show, and James Jacobs's treatment of the
regulation of gun shows is one of the more sobering contributions to
this book. Under the amended Gun Control Act of 1968, people "engaged in the business of selling firearms" must get federal licenses,
are forbidden from selling guns to people in certain restricted categoriesP and are subject to Brady regulations.47 But the "casual" sellers of
43 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 564 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 as an impermissible attempt to expand the Commerce Clause power).
44 United States v Morrison. 529 US 598,627 (2000) (finding the Violence Against Women
Act unconstitutional because it purports to use the commerce power to regulate noncommercial
activity).
45 See 18 USC § 923(a) (2000).
46 The categories include out-of-state residents: people under certain ages specified for
types of guns; people indicted for or convicted of felonies; those adjudged to be mentally defective or committed to mental institutions: illegal drug users and addicts; persons dishonorably
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guns who do not need to have a federal license effectively transform
themselves into people engaged in the business of selling firearms
when they offer their wares at gun shows (p 301). This loophole may
strike some as insane, but Jacobs argues that closing it would be
largely quixotic unless this move came as a lesser-included step within
a broader scheme to regulate absolutely every sale or transfer of guns
(p 308) in the same way we regulate such sales and transfers of automobiles." It may seem wildly cynical of the gun lobby to exploit this
strange social phenomenon as a last-ditch protected area for resale,
unless the lobby believes that gun shows are some sort of sacred social
free space deserving of special legal protection. But it is more likely
that the exploitation of the legal difficulty in closing the loophole as a
justification for retaining the loophole is a transparently instrumental
move by gun advocates to get around licensing laws. Moreover, the
difficulty in regulating gun show sales also serves as an example of the
general difficulty of fully regulating commerce in any highly fluid secondary market. Gun shows are the standing refutation to arguments
that regulation, be it through tort suits, licensing, or the like, can succeed without requiring mass confiscation. Gun shows are a sort of
metaphor for the fluidity of markets and social networks.
That the difficulty in regulating gun shows is but one manifestation of a larger economic problem finds support in the disappointing
performance of the Brady law (pp 290-94). Although we do not know
specifically why the large reduction in gun violence some predicted
Brady would achieve did not materialize-were the laws not enforced
or enforced and merely ineffective? - Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig
suggest that the latter is the more likely supposition. Brady blocked
many thousands of gun sales (p 283); but, we do not know how many
individual would-be gun purchasers this figure represents or whether
these ineligibles found guns by some other means (pp 283-84). Cook
and Ludwig suggest that Brady at least obstructed the interstate flow
of guns (p 285), but again, because they cannot say whether that supply disruption led to more liquid intrastate transactions or simply
revved up the market in illegal guns by increasing their street value,
the disruption of the interstate market would not necessarily lead to
the predicted crime reduction. Using a natural experiment/matched
discharged from the armed forces; people who have renounced American citizenship; and illegal
aliens. 18 USC § 922(b)-(d).
47 18 USC § 922(s)-(t).
48 See James B. Jacobs and Kimberley A. Potter. Keeping Guns out of the "Wrong" Hands:
The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation. 86 J Crim L & Criminol 93, 117-19 (1995) (arguing
that, among other factors, the size of the preexisting stock of unregistered guns, the lack of public
visibility of small guns compared to cars. and the potential disincentives to registration under a
regime where some applicants are presumptively ineligible combine to make gun registration far
less feasible than automobile registration).
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group design (pp 287-90), Cook and Ludwig find no evidence of an
actual decline in the homicide rate contemporaneous with the implementation of the Brady law. 9
Another approach that has been widely advocated, but that may
prove futile, involves civil lawsuits. Perhaps because of the lower burden of proof and the less stigmatic remedy, one might argue that civil
suits against gun sellers can be more effective than individual criminal
cases. Civil suits are arguably even more effective than purely regulatory approaches, which depend on inevitably over- and under-inclusive
bureaucratic rules. But the difficulties in pursuing civil remedies turn
out to be perfectly predictable once we realize that the vague reasonableness standards put to tort juries and the attendant opportunities
for highly contextual and re-frameable fact patterns relate to the core
constitutional and cultural dilemmas about the role of guns in society.
That is, "reasonableness" discussions in the jury room in a tort case
might all too well replicate the national "symbolic values" wars that
Zimring, Slotkin, and Harcourt have depicted. The doctrinal medium
for this symbol-war in tort suits is the causation requirement, which in
the case of gun suits might be quite diffuse. To illustrate this diffusion,
David Kairys stresses the evident (if potentially misleading) fact that
only a tiny percentage of FFLs sell the guns that lead to the majority
of crimes (p 365). He goes on to argue that the occasional gun crime
provokes home purchase of guns, which in turn wind up being used in
suicides (p 368). Moreover, he laments that episodic terrifying events
like Columbine only worsen the problem by provoking more gun purchases (p 369)-demonstrating just what a sociological Gordian knot
this is.
Kairys's solution is to advocate for the recent litigation experiment in public nuisance suits (pp 372-74), brought largely by municipalities (p 364). A local government may seem an especially attractive
plaintiff in regard to an issue where opponents of gun control rely on
federalist deference to state and local authority. The tobacco litigation
has of course shown that the states, if not localities, can serve as highly
coordinated instruments of anti-industry civil prosecution. Moreover,
nuisance law, as Kairys explains, is neither fault-based nor strict liability-it is a looser notion pertaining to interference with the common
right (pp 369, 372). It is a sort of tort against the civic order, with civil
society as the plaintiff-or, for another loose analogy, it invites the
petit jury to serve as a kind of civic grand jury on a matter of social
policy. In a sense, nuisance law is a litigation vehicle for Eisgruber's

49 Cook and Ludwig find some evidence for a decrease in suicides attributable to Brady
(pp 292-93).
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vision of a civic debate about the role of guns in a democracy (pp 14041).
A logical consequence of the nature of a public nuisance suit is
that the remedy cannot be a damage award to individuals, but rather
some sort of abatement injunction, with damages only to the extent of
logistical costs incurred by the governmental plaintiff (p 377). Kairys
implicitly assumes that juries will make the "policy" decision against
guns, even where legislatures cannot (because their instruments are
too cumbersome) or simply will not-presumably because legislatures
are politically captured while their constituents may not be. In fact, to
the extent that Kairys specifies the content of his imagined abatement
injunction, he suggests the very mechanisms that remain so controversial in legislatures: requiring sellers to monitor their buyers or forbidding them to make multiple sales or enroll at gun shows (p 373). Indeed, the one obstacle to these suits, which Kairys holds out as an end
run around a politically captured legislature, has been a pattern of
gun-industry-inspired legislative constraints on these common law actions, which Kairys traces back to a type of legislative encroachment
on the judiciary rarely seen since colonial days (pp 374-75)." '
But even where the legislature has not forbidden these suits, the
picture of litigation success that Kairys paints seems dubious. For the
suits to succeed, juries would have to share Kairys's confidence that
manufacturers have both total control of the lawsuits and high-level
knowledge of the harms they cause. There is no guarantee juries
would favor these aggressive remedies. But even if they were so
inclined, and legislatures restrained from preventing the suits, judges,
acting in their gate-keeping capacity, have been very stingy about
permitting the public nuisance claim ever to get to the juries without,
for example, refining the nuisance doctrine to require proof that the
manufacturers "control and create," rather than merely contribute to,
the downstream harm (pp 376-77). However attractively flexible the
public nuisance tort appears to Kairys, judges still view it as a legal
doctrine subject to highly limiting formal doctrinal constraints. Moreover, judges may react not only to the empirical arguments about the
correlation or causal link between a manufacturer's distribution and
downstream crime, but also to some more normative sense of what is
reasonable to expect from manufacturers for whom the majority of
customers are exercising what they and others consider a moral and
possibly an inherently legal right. Nevertheless, while acknowledging
the likely opposition by the legislature and executive and noncoopera-

0 Moreover, the ATF has not cooperated with the city-plaintiffs in these cases, refusing to
provide the computerized records of its trace calls (p 379), a kind of executive nullification to
complement the broader legislative retrenchment.
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tion by judges and juries, Kairys optimistically notes that even the
greatly successful tobacco litigation started out very slowly (p 379).
In addressing more conventional tort suits, Mark Geistfeld shows
that judicial rejection of suits against gun dealers is consistent with
tort law, not because of a lack of causation or fine points about the
misuse of a product, but because self-defensive use of a gun is sufficiently well established that legitimate self-defense has priority over
third-party interests. That is, the appropriateness of strict liability as a
doctrine to aid tort plaintiffs is ultimately a matter of the net "social
value" of the activity (p 394). And that social value in turn depends on
whether strict liability's benefits to private parties to the lawsuit might
be outweighed by net harm to the legitimate interests of others-in
this case self-defending gun owners for whom strict liability might unduly reduce access to guns (p 394). In Geistfeld's highly refined reading, courts have wrongly finessed the strict liability issue by saying that
guns do not meet the key criterion for the application of strict liability-that they are still dangerous even when reasonable care is exercised (p 389). Moreover, Geistfeld argues that guns should not be
dealt with under a reasonable care/negligence standard because the
careful manufacturer cannot prevent the ardent criminal from finding
a gun (p 387). Ultimately, because the imposition of strict liability requires an inquiry into the social value of the activity (p 394), Geistfeld
suggests that courts have reached the right conclusion, if for the wrong
reasons. Here, self-defense wins the argument for gun defendants:
strict liability would unfairly raise the price of handguns to lawabiding self-defenders (pp 394-95). So it is simply true that the externality that lawful self-defenders impose on innocent third parties is
acceptable under tort law. The interdiction of civil tort suits does not
solve, but simply reinforces, the obstacles to gun control.
The final approach to secondary market interdiction is all about
local policing. It is one thing to arrest people for violent crimes and
enhance their punishments for gun use, and, as noted, that approach
has become an attractive (though perhaps inefficient) policy for the
federal government. It is another to engage in prevention by exploiting the resources of search and seizure law to catch people in the act
of possessing guns they are not entitled to possess, targeting those in
the pool of people most likely to have gotten guns illegally through
the secondary market and to ultimately use them in criminal violence.
Of course, varieties of substantive bans on large categories of guns,
such as the assault weapons ban, are in a sense aimed at this purpose,
but that technique is a separate matter. Rather, the focus of the more
finely tuned empirical discussions in this book is the interdiction of
users of fairly small guns that are illegally possessed because they violate more conventional gun possession laws.
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In a meticulous empirical treatment of the problem, Jeffrey Fagan
and Garth Davies find that a certain kind of aggressive police action
might address the new Oakland phenomenon. Fagan and Davies, in
contrast to other academics who have written about innovative police
techniques, carefully parse types of new policing, distinguishing at
least three categories: "community policing," which deploys police in
non-law-enforcement tasks to improve neighborhood life more generally (p 192); "order-maintenance policing" (OMP), which stresses
prosecutions for minor infractions that offend the local aesthetics and
general quality-of-life and might thereby depress residents' commitment to local order (p 194); and, their real focus, "directed patrol,"
which involves aggressive use of stops/searches and seizures on any
legal ground to interdict people believed to be carrying illegal guns or
otherwise engaged in serious crime (p 194),' with police resources focused on neighborhoods disproportionately represented in those
crimes. At least the latter two categories of policing invoke obvious
concerns about racial profiling. In this volume, Jerome Skolnick and
Abigail Caplovitz address that subject with a useful review of the law,
policy, and empirical debates over this heterogeneous phenomenon
and also offer sensible recommendations for constraining police discretion in order to prevent it. But it is Fagan and Davies who offer the
more striking insights into the racial implications of OMP and directed patrol, especially the implications for police action concentrated on guns and violence (pp 207-09).
Fagan and Davies note that although OMP in New York City
morphed somewhat into a version of directed patrol, the jury is out on
whether it significantly reduced criminal violence in the Giuliani era
(pp 205-06)." Fagan and Davies then focus on the directed patrol efforts in San Diego, Boston, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Jersey City, and
Pittsburgh, and note that studies there suggest some notable success in
terms of increased ratios of recovery of illegal guns to police stops,
along with some evidence of reduction in violent-crime arrests, gun
homicides, homicides generally, gun shots fired, and hospitalizations
for gun injuries (p 197). They then return to New York and take a
51 Fagan and Davies's treatment of these police efforts tells us far too little about what legal rationales or pretexts the police used to ensure that the stops were legal under the Fourth
Amendment and, as a related matter, do not tell us how contingent the legality of the stops was
on the substantive gun laws the police were enforcing. For a useful discussion of some of these
issues, see Wintemute, Guns and Gun Violence at 70-73 (cited in note 38) (citing earlier work by
Fagan himself, as well as others).
52
Indeed, Fagan and Davies were wise to be cautious because arguably the jury is now in,
with recent research suggesting that OMP did not influence the drop in crime; instead, the sheer
increase in the per capita number of police did. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell
in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Seven That Do Not. J Econ Persp (forthcoming 2004) (noting also as dominant explanations an increase in incarceration, legalization of
abortion, and the reversal of the crack-cocaine epidemic).
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whole new tack in examining OMP-they re-analyze New York data
not by the large category of boroughs, but by precincts within boroughs, compared in terms not of OMP arrests for minor offenses, but
in terms of stops on suspicion of guns, drugs, or violent crime (pp 199201). Thus, in a sense, they replicate a kind of directed patrol program
within the OMP project.
The results are weird. The New York figures, based on official
stop-and-frisk records and multiple regression analysis, reveal that
directed patrol stops for violence, and to some extent for drugs, seem
to reduce gun homicide and overall homicide deaths among Hispanics
but not among African-Americans (pp 202-06)) The results are especially striking given that the stop-and-arrest rates for AfricanAmericans, especially for weapons, were far higher than for other
groups (pp 207-08). Fagan and Davies speculate that racial profiling,
beyond questions of constitutional validity or political sensitivity, may
be iatrogenic (p 209). They suggest that as African-Americans perceive more frequent police stops and arrests, the result is either some
loss of respect for law or a weakening of stigma (pp 208-09). This merits further inquiry. Another possible explanation, only barely hinted at
here, is that if African-Americans feel hostile toward the police, they
will deny the police the street intelligence on which a more productive
stop strategy may rely.
Of course, there are ways to avoid the dangerous political effects
of actual or perceived profiling-some involving legally or politically
imposed constraints on profiling in its various forms, but others in the
area of more "community-oriented" policing. Thus, Jenny Berrien and
Christopher Winship offer the solution of church-police relations in a
review of a Boston program deploying prestigious local ministers in
the service of the police. Notably, the ministers did not put most of
their energies into crime-prevention counseling with youth; rather,
they formed partnerships with the police to reform police conduct, in
fact and in perception, and thereby helped vouch to local residents the
good faith of the police (p 239). At one point in recent Boston history,
that church-police partnership seemed to correlate with dramatic decreases in youth homicides, but, alas, a worrisome increase in youth
homicide in Boston has recently occurred (pp 243-44). The authors
rather awkwardly skirt this issue, implicitly hoping that the churchpolice partnership will someday prove manifestly crime-reducing
(p 244). Of course, controlling the variables in this kind of experiment
may be impossible. On the other hand, the Boston program epitomizes a category of program that seems so noble in intention and inarguably useful for reasons other than manifest crime reduction that it
53

Fagan and Davies find the white rate too low to produce useful results (p 205).
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is likely to be sustained even in the absence of evidence of crimereduction and might someday be conducive to further study. So we are
left with the ethical question of how much to invest in highly virtuous
programs with clearly beneficial but highly diffuse effects, when there
is little chance of any assurance that they will produce a measurable,
concrete reduction in homicide levels.
CONCLUSION

And that question leads to another that bears on the wisdom of
so eclectic a book. As I noted at the start, the heterogeneity of such a
volume is understandable and even apt in an area of law where broad
constitutional arguments so entangle with street-level policy debates,
and where both are complicated by the visceral political sentiments
and real and mythical cultural history associated with guns in America. The danger, however, is of becoming so entranced by the interrelationships among these things that one fails to separate them in deciding precisely what one is trying to accomplish in a particular scholarly
effort.
It may seem that the sophisticated intellectual position is to note
that dissensus about the moral value of guns in our culture complicates any resolution of empirical issues about the wisdom of specific
interventions against gun violence. But the next step in sophistication
is to recognize the differences among (a) treating deontological moral
and constitutional views on guns or gun rights (or other rights) as matters distinct from, though arguably trumping, utilitarian notions about
stopping gun violence; (b) pragmatically recognizing how these value
disputes stand as obstacles to empirical resolution; (c) stepping outside the role of policy analyst altogether and into the role of social
historian, tracing the complicated relationship of deontological and
utilitarian notions about guns. In short, the danger is to become so absorbed by the interrelationship among these things as to doubt or lose
interest in the possibility of disinterested, value-free social science.
This is a danger embraced by one contributor to this volume," but
it is largely avoided by the volume as a whole. The danger is always
present when social values and empirical analyses get tied up in each
other. It is fine, for example, to adopt Eisgruber's idea of a civic de54
In what is surely the least useful contribution, Dan Kahan asserts what he considers the
paradox: parties to the gun debate are so motivated by political sentiments that they can never
be persuaded by empirical analysis, but at the same time American political discourse is nevertheless obsessed with consequentialist values (pp 44-45). Kahan concludes that the public-and
presumably legislative -debate should abdicate any expectation of empirical resolution and
49
modestly aim at least for more cordial debate about the political sentiments (p ). This position
mixes non sequiturs with superficial understanding of cultural values and their contingencies,
and ends in a faux-tragic resignation about the possibility of utilitarian projects that disrespects
the very premises of the empirical contributions to the volume.
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bate about the role of guns in a democracy, so long as one recognizes
it as a debate about constitutional values that do not necessarily aim
at reducing gun violence. It is also fine, of course, for some constitutional arguments to rely on empirical assessments of policy as a matter
of conventional legal interest-balancing. It is fine for advocates of the
Boston church initiative to promote its program, even in the face of
doubts as to its crime-reduction capacity, if it clearly serves other
goals. It is unavoidably true that our legislators and public pundits will
mask or distort or suppress-and sometimes even honestly complement-empirical questions with discussions of cultural values. But
scholarly appreciation of these phenomena is very different from
scholarly usefulness to those very legislators and pundits. We should
not want policy analysts to conduct a theater of values; we should
want them to do the math.
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